



**Chicago Mayoral Election Results  
A Tale of Two Cities**

April 15, 2015

Friends,

ICPR recently commissioned Scott Kennedy of Illinois Election Data to provide an analysis of every aspect of the recent Chicago Mayoral elections. **We are sharing our work with you, the press, and other experts for review, comments, and insights.**

Additionally, we plan to release a series of small reports on different aspects of this analysis. **We believe this report, provided by ICPR and Scott Kennedy, offers the most comprehensive data on this unprecedented election.** We welcome your comments and ideas as we continue to explore these topics. Please contact our Deputy Director, Sarah Brune, at [sarah@ilcampaign.org](mailto:sarah@ilcampaign.org) or 312-436-1274 with questions or comments.

**ICPR also held two forums to analyze, dissect, and further understand the April Chicago Runoff Election.** At our first forum, "Empowering Candidates, Empowering Voters," we invited the Mayoral and Aldermanic candidates to discuss campaign finance issues and solutions. Our second forum, "Chicago Politics in Transition," was a sold out event, featuring experts on Chicago elections, Illinois politics, and election data. We look forward to continuing to bring data and analysis to voters in meaningful ways.

**Please consider making a donation** to our mission of providing government transparency, accountability, and oversight.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Susan Garrett". The signature is fluid and cursive.

**Susan Garrett  
Board Chair**

The Illinois Campaign for Political Reform  
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## 2015 Chicago Mayoral Runoff Election Analysis

Scott Kennedy, Illinois Election Data  
 Commissioned by the Illinois Campaign for Political Reform

### Executive Summary

In the February Chicago Mayoral General Election, incumbent Mayor Rahm Emanuel was the leading vote getter, capturing slightly under 50% of the vote, thus forcing a runoff with Cook County Commissioner Jesus “Chuy” Garcia. Garcia finished second with 33.55%, roughly 58,000 fewer votes than Emanuel.

### February Chicago Mayoral General Election Results

<u>Emanuel</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Garcia</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Wilson</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Fioretti</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Walls</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total</u>
218,217	45.63%	160,414	33.55%	50,960	10.66%	35,363	7.39%	13,250	2.77%	478,204
		(57,803)								

The challenge for Garcia heading into the April runoff election was to gain enough voters who previously supported the candidates that did not qualify for the runoff and expand the overall electorate with new Garcia supporters to make up his deficit of 58,000 votes.

Garcia needed to execute a multifaceted approach for attracting voters in order to win. His strategy included consolidating support within his base, winning over constituents who voted for Wilson, Fioretti, or Walls, and gaining undecided voters who may have been disillusioned with the incumbent. He also planned to expand the electorate with communities most likely to favor his candidacy and reach out to communities most likely to vote for Emanuel

### April Chicago Mayoral Runoff Election Results

<u>Emanuel</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Garcia</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total</u>
329,701	56.19%	257,101	43.81%	586,802
		(72,600)		

After six weeks of campaigning, Garcia ultimately came up short, losing by 12%, about 73,000 votes, with some provisional ballots still remaining uncounted. In many instances, the Garcia campaign was able to successfully execute elements of their runoff strategy, but not at the level of intensity required to turn the election in its favor. At the same time, the Emanuel campaign was able to execute a strategy of its own. This included two major goals: neutralizing the Garcia’s campaign’s expected advantage with less affluent voters, who were targeted by Garcia’s core message, and expanding the electorate among their most favorable communities at a rate greater than the Garcia campaign.

*Note: at the time this report was created, the 2015 Mayoral runoff election results were not yet certified and final. The totals shown here were the most current available at time of writing.*

## **“Two Chicagos:” A Tale of Two Cities**

The Garcia campaign worked to portray Chicago as having two distinct parts – one affluent, receiving a disproportionate share of city resources, the other less affluent and forgotten. Garcia attempted to define this narrative in terms of both geography and policy, to make clear that Emanuel’s term as Mayor only benefitted the affluent part of the City while leaving the rest behind. He vowed to be a “Mayor for the entire City,” and promised that the resources available for the improvement of Chicago would be used for the benefit of all.

Garcia spoke to the City Club about the dual city he saw in Chicago, according to the *Chicago Sun Times*. Here is what he had to say about the divide:

*Chicago is becoming a city of the very rich and the very poor with fewer and fewer people in between. We’re becoming a city with glittering buildings surrounded by crumbling neighborhoods. A city with the finest restaurants, surrounded by communities full of people who can’t afford a decent meal. A city with some job growth in a small area downtown, surrounded by a vast area where unemployment rates are 25 to 30 percent. A city with fancy shopping areas surrounded by other areas with boarded-up business districts.*

Garcia then defined his perceived consequences of this division, first on violence:

*The relationship between the city’s inequality and the city’s violence is as plain as day. The vast majority happens between the wonderful little city right outside these walls and the other, much bigger city that’s around it. It’s wrong. It’s unfair, it’s unjust.*

Then on the distribution of City resources and investments:

*Our TIF money goes downtown. These locations contain just 11 percent of Chicago’s population and 5 percent of the geographical area. But they’ve gotten half of the \$1.3 billion in TIF money the mayor has passed out since he’s taken office. But plainly, the mayor of Chicago is spending TIF money in the exact opposite way that it’s supposed to be spent after promising not to do it. It’s Robin Hood in the reverse. It’s been going on for years.*

We searched 2010 census data for numbers to back up the ideas of Chicago as two separate cities using 2010 US Census Data. We then reviewed the election results to measure candidates’ performance in these two parts of the City.

We began this analysis by studying map files. For many years, campaigns have been able to obtain precinct maps from the Chicago Board of Elections. These maps are printed on large sheets of paper and can be found lining the conference room walls of a typical campaign office. Today, these maps are available in a more useful electronic format that includes the same type of data commonly used for GPS devices. We can use software to overlay maps to find a myriad of useful information.

For our purposes, we overlaid the map of every precinct for the 2015 Chicago elections (precinct boundaries often change from election to election) with the map of census tract boundaries from the 2010 US Census. That overlay shows precincts overlapped by census tracks, and reveals the amount of land by which they overlap. This allowed us to combine vote totals by precinct and census tract data, including race, income and education. The numbers were then prorated based on a percentage of land

area. This is not a perfect methodology, because it assumes that people are evenly distributed in any given geography, which is not always the case. This can be especially true in a dense urban environment like the City of Chicago. However, it still provides a wealth of useable data that can be analyzed in many different ways.

After running the numbers outlined above, we wanted to find a profile for the “two Chicagos” as they have been described. According to the narrative laid out by Garcia, one constituency should be affluent and predominantly white, while the other should be less affluent with a far greater representation of minority populations. Roughly half of the voters in both the February general election and the April runoff election live in areas where the median household income is above \$60,000, and the other half of the voters live in areas where the median household income is below \$60,000.

<b>Voters</b>	<b>Feb GE</b>	<b>Apr Runoff</b>
Voters living in areas w/median HH income > \$60,000	49.53%	50.26%
Voters living in areas w/median HH income < \$60,000	50.47%	49.74%

If we look at precincts where the majority of the population is African American, 83% of those voters live in areas where the median household income is under \$60,000. The same goes for Hispanic majority precincts. In precincts where the majority of the population is Hispanic, 83% of those voters live in areas where the median household income is under \$60,000.

<b>Voters</b>	<b>&gt; \$60,000</b>	<b>&lt; \$60,000</b>
African American majority precincts	17.25%	82.75%
Hispanic majority precincts	16.57%	83.43%
White majority precincts	93.75%	6.25%
No (mixed) majority precincts	49.65%	50.35%

On the other hand, only 6% of voters living in white majority precincts live in areas where the median household income is under \$60,000.

This looks like a good workable definition of the “two Chicagos” as described by Garcia. Using the 2010 US Census data, we can divide the city’s voters into roughly two equal parts: over and under a median household income of \$60,000. These data sets provide two distinct sets of Chicagoans similar to the ones described by Garcia in his City Club speech. More than just a talking point, the data demonstrates that such delineation exists in the City.

As expected, Rahm Emanuel won the more affluent half of the more affluent voting group. Of the voters living in areas with median household incomes greater than \$60,000, 63% voted for Emanuel, compared to just 37% who voted for Garcia.

<b>Median HH Income</b>	<b>Emanuel</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Garcia</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Total</b>
\$60,000 to \$250,000	184,277	62.87%	108,846	37.13%	293,126
			(75,431)		

In order to offset the advantage Emanuel had with affluent voters, Garcia needed to win the less affluent half of voters by a greater margin. Not only was Garcia unable to acquire more than 63% of the less affluent half of voters, ultimately costing him the election, Emanuel, surprisingly, came close to winning a majority in this same constituency.

<b>Median HH Income</b>	<b>Emanuel</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Garcia</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Total</b>
\$0 to \$60,000	144,296	49.44%	147,584	50.57%	291,850
	(3,288)				

Emanuel, losing the less affluent half of voters by a single percentage point, was able to neutralize any advantage Garcia attempted to gain with his “two Chicagos” message. This result is remarkable for a number of reasons. Campaigning on behalf of a forgotten and neglected part of Chicago was one of the central components of the Garcia campaign’s narrative, but did not prove effective enough to win. The man that many called “Mayor One Percent” would actually still be a viable candidate for Mayor even if the top half of the city’s most affluent voters were removed from the equation. Finally, the emerging post-election narrative, particularly from the Mayor’s detractors, is that there is a less affluent part of Chicago that has rejected the Mayor. However, the data does not support that conclusion. Support for the Mayor has been shown as a clear 50/50 split among voters with annual incomes up to \$60,000.

The Garcia campaign came up short in strategy where it needed to demonstrate a clear opportunity for advocacy, and the Mayor outperformed expectations in an area where he was thought to be vulnerable.

### **The Runoff**

When the February General Election was finished and it became clear that Emanuel and Garcia would face each other in the Runoff, there were two competing theories that emerged on how the Runoff would play out:

1. Emanuel received more than 45% of the vote in the February general election and only had to improve his standing against Garcia by a small amount to obtain the majority in a head to head matchup, while Garcia had to significantly improve upon his 34% support from the February general election. Some argued that Emanuel had the shorter path to a majority.
2. A majority of voters had already voted against the incumbent Mayor, and so long as Garcia was able to consolidate all of the anti-incumbent votes, he had a clear path to a majority.

We now know after seeing the final totals in the runoff that the second theory did not prevail. It is worth exploring those voters that were in play in the runoff and analyzing who won many of the newly available voters in the Runoff Election.

The operating assumption in this analysis is that any voter that came out in February and voted for either Emanuel or Garcia would do so again in April. This is not a perfect assumption, but is reasonable and necessary to explore these data sets.

<b>Candidate</b>	<b>February GE</b>	<b>April Runoff</b>	<b>New Voters</b>	<b>%</b>
Emanuel	218,217	329,701	111,484	53.55%
Garcia	160,414	257,101	96,687	46.45%

The new voters available to Emanuel and Garcia in the runoff included any February General Election voters who voted for one of the original candidates that didn't qualify for the runoff (Wilson, Fioretti or Walls) and newly registered voters who did not participate in the February Election. Among these newly available voters, Emanuel outperformed Garcia 54% to 46%.

As we'll discuss in the next two sections, Emanuel's strength among newly available voters in the runoff came largely from both an increase in registration of white voters and a strong performance among white voters. However, Garcia outperformed than Emanuel among newly available African American and Hispanic voters.

### **Turnout**

Turnout increased from 34% in the February general election to just shy of 41% in the April Runoff. The Mayor's race saw an increase of almost 109,000 votes overall.

<b>Voters</b>	<b>Feb - All</b>		<b>Apr - All</b>		<b>Net</b>	
	<b>Mayor Voters</b>	<b>Share</b>	<b>Mayor Voters</b>	<b>Share</b>	<b>Change</b>	<b>Share</b>
African American majority precincts	165,250	34.57%	187,869	32.03%	22,619	20.83%
Hispanic majority precincts	75,250	15.74%	100,954	17.21%	25,704	23.67%
White majority precincts	176,561	36.94%	222,930	38.00%	46,369	42.71%
No (mixed) majority precincts	60,946	12.75%	74,828	12.76%	13,882	12.79%

If elected, Garcia would have served as the City's first Hispanic mayor. This opportunity for representation increased enthusiasm among Hispanic Voters. Hispanic majority precincts showed an increase of 26,000 voters in April over February, and made up 24% of the total voters in April versus making up just 16% of the February electorate. Enthusiastic Hispanic voters increased both their raw numbers and their percentage of the electorate, likely giving a boost to the Garcia campaign.

Unfortunately, new voters in white majority precincts voted in even greater numbers. There were 46,000 more voters in white majority precincts in April than there were in February, offsetting any gains Garcia likely made with increased Hispanic turnout.

The Garcia campaign needed to increase Hispanic turnout to have a chance to win the April runoff. Increasing turnout in this community is a challenge, given that the Hispanic population generally has the fewest number of raw voters registered and voting, and Hispanic turnout remains generally low as an overall percentage of registered voters. Of the 10 wards with the fewest ballots cast in the February General Election, 9 were majority Hispanic population wards. Of the 12 wards with the poorest turnout percentage in February, 6 were majority Hispanic population wards.

The Garcia campaign is not the first campaign that has tried to increase the turnout of Hispanic voters. For many reasons, it remains a difficult task. The Garcia campaign generated a great amount of enthusiasm and turnout among Hispanic voters. Unfortunately, it was not enough to secure the majority.

## 2015 Mayoral Runoff by Race

The next data set was achieved by overlaying 2015 Chicago election precincts with 2010 US Census Tract boundaries, prorating the census data based on land area, and using these findings to classify precincts as either majority African American, majority Hispanic, majority white or no (mixed) majority. These numbers represent the 2015 Chicago Mayor February General Election results broken down by race of voters:

<b>Voters</b>	<b>Emanuel</b>	<b>Garcia</b>	<b>Wilson</b>	<b>Fioretti</b>	<b>Walls</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Share</b>
African American majority precincts	42.28%	23.32%	23.89%	4.55%	5.94%	165,250	34.57%
White majority precincts	53.63%	31.84%	3.05%	10.56%	0.91%	176,561	36.94%
Hispanic majority precincts	34.38%	56.03%	3.13%	5.56%	0.85%	75,250	15.74%
No (mixed) majority precincts	45.52%	38.58%	5.99%	8.10%	1.81%	60,946	12.75%

This data set is the result of the same methodology applied to the 2015 Chicago Mayor April Runoff:

<b>Voters</b>	<b>Emanuel</b>	<b>Garcia</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Share</b>
African American majority precincts	57.43%	42.58%	187,869	32.03%
White majority precincts	66.54%	33.46%	222,930	38.00%
Hispanic majority precincts	33.28%	66.73%	100,954	17.21%
No (mixed) majority precincts	53.12%	46.89%	74,828	12.76%

In February, Emanuel had the highest level of support in majority African American areas by about 20 percentage points. Garcia did not hit that mark, but he did gain equal support to the best performing black candidate, Willie Wilson. As the Runoff campaign began, a number of prominent African American leaders, such as Congressman Danny Davis and Jesse Jackson's Rainbow/PUSH Coalition, endorsed Garcia's candidacy, giving him some important third party validators important to African American voters. Furthermore, 34% of the February voters living in a majority African American precinct voted for one of the three candidates who did not qualify for the runoff, so a significant element of this population was newly available for the Runoff candidates to gain in April.

## April Chicago Mayoral Runoff Election Results w/Feb Emanuel and Feb Garcia Votes Omitted

<b>Voters</b>	<b>Emanuel</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Garcia</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Total</b>
African American majority precincts	38,032	47.85%	41,447	52.15%	79,479
White majority precincts	53,639	74.48%	18,379	25.52%	72,018
Hispanic majority precincts	7,725	23.46%	25,205	76.54%	32,930
No (mixed) majority precincts	12,006	50.92%	11,571	49.08%	23,577

If we subtract the voters in these precincts who voted for either Emanuel or Garcia in February, Garcia actually won the newly available voters in majority African American precincts 52%-48%. Ultimately, that percentage was not high enough to overcome the natural advantage that Emanuel had already received. In the end, Emanuel won the April Runoff in majority African American precincts 57%-43%.

Among Hispanic majority precincts, there was a concerted effort on the part of the Garcia campaign to increase enthusiasm to improve both turnout and performance. Their efforts did increase Hispanic turnout; however, their improvement in performance was minimal. In the February General Election, Garcia led Emanuel in majority Hispanic precincts 56%-34%. In the April Runoff Election, Garcia essentially consolidated all the non-Emanuel votes in these Hispanic majority precincts, winning them 67%-33%.

The outcome in white majority precincts nearly mirrored that of Hispanic majority precincts. In February, Emanuel led Garcia in white majority precincts 54%-32%. In the April Runoff Election, Emanuel essentially consolidated non-Garcia votes in these white majority precincts, and won them 67%-33%. In the April Runoff, the percentage performance that Garcia and Emanuel received in the Hispanic and white majority precincts respectively mirrored one another at 67%-33%. Unfortunately for Garcia, the pool of voters in white majority precincts is far larger and made up a much greater of the overall electorate. Garcia just couldn't overcome the fact that his most robust constituency is not a majority of the Chicago electorate

### 2015 Mayoral Runoff by Income

After overlaying the 2015 Chicago election precincts and 2010 US census tract boundaries and prorating the census data based on land area, we were able to classify precincts by income range as designated by that census tract's median household income:

Income Range	Emanuel	%	Garcia	%	Total	Share
\$0 - \$20,000	379	58.67%	267	41.33%	646	0.11%
\$20,000 - \$40,000	38,905	54.00%	33,148	46.01%	72,048	12.28%
\$40,000 - \$60,000	105,012	47.92%	114,169	52.09%	219,156	37.35%
\$60,000 - \$80,000	81,987	56.23%	63,816	43.77%	145,802	24.85%
\$80,000 - \$100,000	38,024	61.57%	23,737	38.43%	61,762	10.53%
\$100,000 - \$120,000	24,661	71.25%	9,944	28.73%	34,611	5.90%
\$120,000 - \$140,000	16,634	72.44%	6,329	27.56%	22,962	3.91%
\$140,000 - \$160,000	11,438	78.60%	3,117	21.42%	14,553	2.48%
\$160,000 - \$180,000	5,452	85.52%	923	14.48%	6,375	1.09%
\$180,000 - \$200,000	4,488	85.53%	759	14.47%	5,247	0.89%
\$200,000 - \$250,000	1,593	87.82%	221	12.18%	1,814	0.31%
Unknown	1,092	62.33%	662	37.79%	1,752	0.30%

The Share column shows that about 50% of the total vote came from areas where the median household income was less than \$60,000. Overall, Garcia had a very slight edge with that group:

Income Range	Emanuel	%	Garcia	%	Total	Share
\$0 - \$60,000	144,296	49.44%	147,584	50.57%	291,850	49.74%
\$60,000 - \$250,000	184,277	62.87%	108,846	37.13%	293,126	49.96%
Unknown	1,092	62.33%	662	37.79%	1,752	0.30%

There data shows that higher income areas were more likely to support Emanuel. Garcia was not able to gain a clear advantage with any of these subsets.

## 2015 Mayoral Runoff by Education

The next data set was achieved by overlaying 2015 Chicago election precincts with 2010 US Census Tract boundaries, prorating the census data based on land area, and using these findings to classify precincts by education ranges, defined by the percentage of residents with an education level of bachelor's degree or higher:

<b>Pct w/Bachelors Degree</b>	<b>Emanuel</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Garcia</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Share</b>
0% - 20%	113,092	48.59%	119,676	51.42%	232,751	39.67%
20% - 40%	90,586	55.01%	74,103	45.00%	164,680	28.07%
40% - 60%	44,220	57.29%	32,973	42.72%	77,191	13.16%
60% - 80%	61,908	70.85%	25,468	29.15%	87,374	14.89%
80% - 100%	18,767	81.67%	4,210	18.32%	22,980	3.92%
Unknown	1,092	62.33%	662	37.79%	1,752	0.30%

The results here are similar to the results delineated by income. Higher education rates correlated to higher support for Emanuel.

## Comparison to the 2011 Mayoral Election

Using the same methodology as the data set above, these are the 2011 Mayoral Election results by income range:

<b>Income Range</b>	<b>Emanuel</b>	<b>Chico</b>	<b>Del Valle</b>	<b>Braun</b>	<b>Watkins</b>	<b>Walls</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Share</b>
\$0 - \$20,000	61.57%	7.84%	3.04%	22.75%	3.42%	1.38%	1811	0.31%
\$20,000 - \$40,000	57.47%	12.50%	4.93%	19.86%	3.60%	1.59%	74560	12.63%
\$40,000 - \$60,000	51.63%	22.39%	10.68%	12.02%	2.10%	1.15%	213922	36.24%
\$60,000 - \$80,000	53.49%	29.68%	10.14%	5.02%	1.00%	0.65%	150538	25.50%
\$80,000 - \$100,000	53.43%	31.49%	9.94%	3.89%	0.75%	0.50%	65066	11.02%
\$100,000 - \$120,000	62.99%	24.66%	8.20%	3.05%	0.63%	0.44%	34339	5.82%
\$120,000 - \$140,000	66.37%	22.65%	7.90%	2.12%	0.48%	0.47%	22582	3.83%
\$140,000 - \$160,000	68.49%	21.36%	7.76%	1.77%	0.39%	0.23%	12999	2.20%
\$160,000 - \$180,000	76.16%	17.11%	4.79%	1.22%	0.39%	0.24%	7113	1.20%
\$180,000 - \$200,000	76.98%	15.43%	5.03%	2.00%	0.33%	0.19%	4192	0.71%
\$200,000 - \$250,000	80.55%	15.02%	3.26%	0.72%	0.13%	0.31%	2237	0.38%
Unknown	67.36%	10.23%	11.88%	8.47%	1.45%	0.62%	968	0.16%

Here is a summation of 2011 results segmented by over/under \$60,000 median HH income precincts:

<b>Voters</b>	<b>Emanuel</b>	<b>Chico</b>	<b>Del Valle</b>	<b>Braun</b>	<b>Watkins</b>	<b>Walls</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Share</b>
\$0 - \$60,000	53.19%	19.76%	9.16%	14.10%	2.50%	1.27%	290,293	49.17%
\$60,000 - \$250,000	57.26%	28.00%	9.35%	4.02%	0.81%	0.54%	299,066	50.66%
Unknown	67.36%	10.23%	11.88%	8.47%	1.45%	0.62%	968	0.16%

And here is the breakdown of the 2011 General Election by race:

<b>Voters</b>	<b>Emanuel</b>	<b>Chico</b>	<b>Del Valle</b>	<b>Braun</b>	<b>Watkins</b>	<b>Walls</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Share</b>
African American majority precincts	59.12%	10.15%	3.55%	21.65%	3.63%	1.87%	202,029	34.25%
White majority precincts	58.47%	29.84%	9.21%	1.65%	0.47%	0.34%	228,282	38.71%
Hispanic majority precincts	36.76%	40.81%	19.37%	2.12%	0.60%	0.33%	85,371	14.47%
No (mixed) majority precincts	56.18%	23.84%	13.36%	4.95%	1.00%	0.64%	74,101	12.56%

A few final thoughts:

- In 2011, Emanuel received 53% of the vote in precincts with a median household income under \$60,000. In the April 2015 Runoff, that fell to just under 50%.
- In 2011, Emanuel received 59% of the vote in African American majority precincts. In the April 2015 Runoff, he received over 57%.
- In 2011, Emanuel received 37% of the vote in Hispanic majority precincts. In the April 2015 Runoff, that fell to 33%.

In each of these areas, Emanuel's support eroded slightly from 2011 to 2015. Still, he was able to secure the majority despite a field of detractors. For the reasons listed in this report, Garcia was not able to gain the votes necessary to overcome Emanuel's lead.